On his first day in office last year, President Trump signed Executive Order 14,160. That Order attempted to end birthright citizenship for children born in the United States to parents without permanent immigration status. Today, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in a case challenging the constitutionality of that order. And Cato has filed anย amicusย briefย in support of the Orderโs challengers, explaining how and why the Order contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court should affirm the lower courtโs holding that the Order is unconstitutional.
The Fourteenth Amendment commands, โAll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.โ The key debate in this case hinges on the meaning of the middle portion of that sentence: โsubject to the jurisdiction thereof.โ

The government argues that the phrase โsubject to the jurisdiction thereofโ in the Fourteenth Amendment requires that newborn children be subject to Americaโsย politicalย jurisdiction, not just regulatory jurisdiction. Political jurisdiction, in the governmentโs view, demands allegiance to the United Statesโand therefore domicileโfor citizenship. The government argues that children of parents without permanent immigration status cannot be domiciled in the United States, so they are not born citizens.
But as our brief explains, this argument does not comport with the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Contemporaneous definitions, writings of the time, and court precedent show that โsubject to the jurisdiction thereofโ only required that children be born under the United Statesโ authority (that is, be bound to follow US law). Because children of parents without permanent immigration status are under the authority of the United States and born in the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment grants them citizenship.
The ordinary public meaning of the text is corroborated by the Fourteenth Amendmentโs purpose. In the past, the Court improperly limited this purpose in theย Slaughter-House Casesย (1873) and excluded those the Fourteenth Amendment meant to protect. We argue that this Court should avoid making that mistake again and affirm the broad purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment: to protect โall persons.โ And the set of โall personsโ includes the children of parents without permanent immigration status.
Our brief concludes with a rebuttal of another amicus brief in this case. Professor Ilan Wurmanโsย amicusย briefย provides an account of the common law of birthright citizenship and a purported application of originalism that pays insufficient attention to the Constitutionโs original public meaning. We argue that a more faithful deployment of originalism cannot support Professor Wurmanโs conclusions.
In the end, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizenship to nearly all persons born in the United States, with exceptions far narrower than the Executive Orderโs scope. The president cannot ignore, rewrite, or abandon that promise by executive order. The Supreme Court should affirm the judgment below and issue a judgment that respects the right of birthright citizenship that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed.



